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INTRODUCTION 
Electronic discovery, or e-discovery, has dramatically changed litigation 
and challenges lawyers on a daily basis.1 Attorneys must now conduct 
discovery differently due to the high number and cost of documents being 
processed.2 Faced with large universes of electronically stored information 
 
† Senior Editor, Volume 161, University of Pennsylvania Law Review; J.D., 2013, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2010, University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank my 
colleagues on the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their hard work and perceptive 
suggestions; my family for always helping me to keep the law in perspective; and Molly, for her 
love and support.  
1 See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 322 
(2008) (“It is hard to miss e-discovery nowadays. . . . [W]e must recognize how riveting it has 
become in American litigation.”). Two leading authors in this field define e-discovery as “[t]he 
process of identifying, preserving, collecting, processing, searching, reviewing, and producing 
Electronically Stored Information that may be [r]elevant to a civil, criminal, or regulatory matter.” 
Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of Technology-Assisted 
Review, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2013). 
2 See Laurie A. Weiss, Protection of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product in the E-
Discovery Era (“Litigation often involves review and productions of tens or hundreds of thousands 
of electronic documents.”), in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: 
PROTECTING AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 163, 164 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 4th ed. 
2008); The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of 
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 192 (2007) 
[hereinafter Sedona Best Practices] (noting the decreasing cost of storing larger amounts of data, but 
the rising cost of reviewing that same data). 
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(ESI), litigators have turned to search terms, also known as keywords,3 to 
conduct discovery efficiently.4 
The law of e-discovery has developed rapidly, leaving lawyers scram-
bling to catch up.5 Judge Lee Rosenthal, a leading thinker in the field, has 
stated that “[i]t is hard to overstate the importance and the degree of 
anxiety generated by electronic discovery in the world today. It is not just 
in the world of big business; it is in the world of organizations[,] generally, 
large data producers.”6 Costs have skyrocketed due to the enormous volume 
of data being stored,7 a trend likely to continue.  
Lawyers use search terms8 to conduct cost-efficient9 and reasonable10 
discovery. Search terms are applied to a selected group of the client’s data 
 
3 “Search terms” and “keywords” are used interchangeably throughout this Comment. 
4 Attorneys no longer rely exclusively on search terms in e-discovery, and may use other, 
more advanced technologies instead. See infra note 5. However, many of these newer technologies, 
such as predictive coding, still use search terms in some way. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. 
Simek, Predictive Coding: A Rose by Any Other Name, LAW PRAC. MAG., July/Aug. 2012, at 20, 22. 
5 Even while this Comment was written, judges and attorneys have had to consider a new 
technology called various names including “predictive coding,” “computer-assisted review,” and 
“technology-assisted review.” See Nelson & Simek, supra note 4, at 20. Judges and attorneys have 
been grappling with this technology, and not without controversy. See Da Silva Moore v. Publicis 
Groupe SA, No. 1279, 2012 WL 1446534, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) (seeking reversal of a 
magistrate judge’s order to use predictive coding); Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, 868 F. 
Supp. 2d 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (requesting that a magistrate judge recuse himself because his 
order to use predictive coding allegedly demonstrated an “appearance of partiality”); see also 
EORHB, Inc. v. HOA Holdings LLC, No. 7409-VCL, 2012 WL 4896670, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
15, 2012) (ordering, sua sponte, that “[a]bsent . . . good cause shown, the parties shall . . . 
conduct document review with the assistance of predictive coding”).  
6 Colloquy, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 
(2007) (quoting the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal of the Southern District of Texas). Judge 
Rosenthal chaired the Federal Judicial Conference Advisory Committee for the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and oversaw the promulgation of the important 2006 “electronic discovery amend-
ments” to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 2-3. 
7 See Weiss, supra note 2, at 165 (“A terabyte of information is often the relevant unit of 
measure in large civil litigation or government investigations today. A terabyte is 1,000 gigabytes, 
or 1,000,000 megabytes. . . . [A] terabyte of printed paper pages would produce a stack 
approximately equal to the height of 58 Empire State buildings.”). 
8 Other methods of managing the burden of e-discovery include “clawback” and “quick-peek” 
agreements. See id. at 169-70. These agreements reach beyond the scope of this Comment, but 
litigators should be familiar with their benefits and drawbacks, as well as their appropriate use. See 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., 
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES 51, 54-55 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES]. 
9 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 192 (discussing how technological advances in 
search methodologies can help control the cost of e-discovery). 
10 Courts require discovery processes to be “reasonable.” Search terms provide an excellent 
way for attorneys to prove the reasonableness of their discovery process to a court. See, e.g., Smith 
v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., No. 07-681, 2009 WL 2045197, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2009) 
(finding that a “thorough explanation of the search terms and procedures used would be a large 
step” in demonstrating that the defendant’s search for documents was reasonable). 
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in order to preserve, collect, and produce relevant documents.11 Lawyers 
develop keywords with clients by working together to figure out who and 
what will be important to the case. By assessing the case, reviewing docu-
ments, and speaking with the client, the attorney develops conclusions 
about what will be relevant in the case and distills those conclusions into 
search terms to locate relevant documents. The final product of this process 
has not been consistently afforded work product protection,12 counter to the 
policies of the work product doctrine. In this Comment, I argue that search 
terms deserve protection from compelled disclosure as opinion work product. 
Part I of this Comment gives a brief overview of how attorneys develop 
search terms, ideally through a process like that outlined by the Sedona 
Conference’s Best Practices.13 Part II examines the beginnings of the work 
product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor, the policies of the doctrine, and the 
partial codification of the doctrine in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Part III briefly notes how the common law has filled in gaps left by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Part IV dives into the jurispru-
dence of search terms as work product and then focuses on how protecting 
search terms as opinion work product best fulfills the policies of the doctrine. 
I. ATTORNEYS DEVELOP SEARCH TERMS BY WORKING WITH THE 
CLIENT TO DECIDE WHAT IS RELEVANT TO THE CASE 
Lawyers do not automatically know which keywords14 will be helpful in 
locating relevant documents. Search terms do not exist separately from 
 
11 See The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Achieving Quality in the 
E-Discovery Process, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 299, 316 (2009) [hereinafter Sedona Achieving Quality] 
(noting that keyword searches are “well known and may be used” for selection, organization, and 
filtering of ESI). 
12 See infra Section IV.A. 
13 Though not a binding authority, the Sedona Conference has established itself as the 
preeminent authority on all topics related to electronic discovery. See, e.g., John B. v. Goetz, 531 
F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing the Sedona Conference’s “Sedona Principles” multiple 
times); Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 424 (D.N.J. 2009) (“The 
Sedona Principles and Sedona commentaries thereto are the leading authorities on electronic 
document retrieval and production.”); 1 JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. GLEISNER, III, EDIS-
COVERY & DIGITAL EVIDENCE § 1:7 (2005) (“While not law, the [Sedona P]rinciples are 
definitely persuasive authority of the first order.”). Courts routinely look to the Sedona Confer-
ence and its Principles to determine the reasonableness of a proposed discovery process. See, e.g., 
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D. Md. 2008) (“[C]ompliance with 
the Sedona Conference Best Practices for use of search and information retrieval will go a long way 
towards convincing the court that the method chosen was reasonable and reliable . . . .”). 
14 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 200 (“‘[K]eyword searches’ refers to set-based 
searching using simple words or word combinations, with or without Boolean and related 
operators . . . .”); Grossman & Cormack, supra note 1, at 21 (defining “keyword” as a word used 
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litigation, but rather are generated through the attorney’s analysis of the 
case at hand. To develop good search terms, an attorney works closely with 
the client and makes judgments about what is relevant in the case based on, 
among other things, review of important documents and interviews with 
key players.15 The attorney assesses the case and reviews relevant ESI in a 
cyclical fashion, continually developing a list of keywords that reflects the 
lawyer’s mental impressions and conclusions about what is relevant to the 
case. 
A. The Purpose and Use of Search Terms 
Attorneys develop search terms as a litigation tool in order to conduct 
an efficient discovery process. Keywords help an attorney locate the im-
portant documents within a set of ESI in a more cost-effective way than 
manual review. The best search terms can identify and retrieve relevant16 
documents without also retrieving nonrelevant information. 
Attorneys can use search terms for a variety of reasons, such as to limit 
the number of documents to review, to identify the most critical documents 
for early case assessment, or to find potentially privileged information.17 
Lawyers in previous decades used manual review, but technology has 
created dramatically larger sets of ESI, making human review of each 
document prohibitively expensive and time consuming.18 Attorneys do still 
 
as part of a keyword search and defining “keyword search” as a search that returns all documents 
that contain the keyword); see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. 
DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & 
DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 30 (3d ed. 2010) (defining keyword to be “[a]ny 
specified word, or combination of words, used in a search, with the intent of locating certain 
results”). 
15 See generally Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 209 (discussing ways to “maximize the 
chances of success in . . . finding responsive documents” by “capitalizing on ‘human knowledge’”). 
16 I use “relevant” and “responsive” somewhat interchangeably, but they have different 
meanings. “Relevance” refers to whether a document pertains to the claims and defenses of a case. 
See Grossman & Cormack, supra note 1, at 28. “Responsive” refers to whether a document pertains 
to a particular discovery request. Id. 
17 EDRM Search Guide, THE ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL (EDRM), § 4, 
http://www.edrm.net/resources/guides/edrm-search-guide/search-framework (last visited May 6, 
2013). 
18 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 208 (noting there is “no reasonable possibility” to 
do manual review in most litigation); see also Gregory L. Fordham, Using Keyword Search Terms in 
E-Discovery and How They Relate to Issues of Responsiveness, Privilege, Evidence Standards and Rube 
Goldberg, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2009) (suggesting that practitioners will use search terms 
with greater frequency “as digital evidence and e-discovery force them to forego the traditional 
‘boots on the ground’ approach”); Donald Wochna, Electronic Data, Electronic Searching, Inadvertent 
Production of Privileged Data: A Perfect Storm, 43 AKRON L. REV. 847, 848 (2010) (“Faced with 
enormous volumes of client data that must be reviewed for privilege and unacceptably high costs 
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utilize manual review to analyze individual documents that are retrieved,19 
but automated methods are usually necessary to sort through the enormous 
amount of ESI. Though many in the e-discovery community have deserv-
edly criticized a keyword-only discovery process,20 keywords still serve a 
useful purpose, either alone or, more likely, in conjunction with other 
search technologies.21  
Keywords enable a user to retrieve the documents of interest by searching 
the set of ESI and finding the selected word or phrase in the document.22 
For example, searching a client’s emails for his lawyer’s name or email 
address can pinpoint emails to review for attorney–client privilege more 
efficiently than manually searching the whole set for the attorney’s name 
and then reviewing for privilege. Search terms enable a lawyer and client to 
save time and money by focusing on the relevant documents. 
Keyword searches should retrieve as many relevant documents as possible 
without also retrieving nonrelevant ones. Precision and recall are two ways 
to measure the effectiveness of search terms in returning the correct docu-
ments. “Precision” is the measurement of how many responsive documents 
were retrieved by a search compared to how many documents were retrieved 
overall by that same term.23 High precision indicates that a search term 
returned many responsive documents and only few nonresponsive ones.24 
For example, a search term returning ninety responsive documents and ten 
 
of manual review, many attorneys are relying upon electronic searches to identify privileged 
documents within large client data sets.”). 
19 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 209 (“[I]n many cases, both automated and manual 
searches will be conducted: with initial searches by automated means to cull down a large universe 
of material to more manageable size, followed by a secondary manual review process.”). 
20 See, e.g., Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, No. 08-6912, 2012 WL 1634832, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. May 9, 2012) (“[U]nfortunately, even a well-designed and tested keyword search has serious 
limitations. Chief among them is that such a search necessarily results in false positives (irrelevant 
documents flagged because they contain a search term) and false negatives (relevant documents not 
flagged since they do not contain a search term).”); Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 201 
(“[S]imple keyword searches end up being both over- and under-inclusive in light of the inherent 
malleability and ambiguity of spoken and written English (as well as other languages).”). 
21 For example, Judge Peck noted in his order in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, 287 
F.R.D. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), that the parties used keyword searches for their expanded seed 
set before using predictive coding. Though keywords were not the main discovery tools, they 
played a crucial role in beginning the technology-assisted review. See also In re Biomet M2A 
Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-2391, 2013 WL 1729682 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 
2013). 
22 See supra note 14. 
23 EDRM Search Guide, supra note 17, § 9.4, http://www.edrm.net/resources/guides/edrm-
search-guide/validation-of-results (last visited May 6, 2013). Precision is measured by the following 
formula: Precision = Number of Responsive Documents Retrieved ÷ Total Number Retrieved. Id. 
24 Id. 
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nonresponsive ones would have ninety percent precision. “Recall,” on the 
other hand, is the measurement of how many responsive documents a 
search term retrieves compared to how many responsive documents there 
are in the entire set of ESI.25 A high recall indicates that the search term 
was effective in retrieving all of the responsive documents in the set of ESI, 
and that few responsive documents remain to be identified.26 For example, 
the search term that identified ninety responsive documents with ninety 
percent precision may have a small recall. If there are 120 responsive 
documents in total, the search term has recall of seventy-five percent; but if 
there are 900 responsive documents, the search term has recall of only ten 
percent; ninety percent of the responsive documents are not identified by 
the keyword.  
Attorneys use recall and precision to ensure that search terms are identi-
fying all the relevant documents, and only the relevant documents. Unlike a 
lawyer using Google or a legal database to find one document, an attorney 
running search terms on ESI seeks to find all the documents relevant to the 
claims and defenses. To achieve the goal of efficient discovery with search 
terms, keywords should have high precision and recall. 
B. Search Terms Developed by an Attorney and a Client 
Reflect the Attorney’s Mental Impressions and 
Conclusions About the Case 
Attorneys develop search terms through an iterative process of assessing 
the case and gathering information. Lawyers review documents, interview 
witnesses or key players, and test search terms in a cyclical manner. 
Through this process, an attorney creates mental impressions about the case 
and decides which keywords best distill those impressions to produce 
relevant documents with high recall and precision.27 While the use of search 
terms does not by itself result in a reasonable or effective discovery process, 
a well thought-out process of creating search terms should “maximize the 
chances of success.”28 Because this process involves the attorney making a 
 
25 Id. 
26 Id. Recall is measured by the following formula: Recall = Number of Responsive Docu-
ments Retrieved ÷ Total Number of Responsive Documents. Id. 
27 See Steven C. Bennett, Do Ask, Do Tell: Keyword Search Terms, 2009 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 44, 44 
(Oct.) (noting that “cogent keyword search strategy generally requires discussions with the client” 
about which terms would be best); David J. Kessler et al., Search Terms Are More than Mere Words: 
Order Their Disclosure With Care, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 21, 2011, at S2 (“[S]earch terms are developed by 
counsel working with the client and interviewing ‘key players’ to determine what is important and 
how people discussed it.”). 
28 Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 209. 
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series of conclusions and mental impressions about the case, it merits 
protection as opinion work product.  
To create good search terms, there should be “substantial human input 
on the front end.”29 The attorney and client must first consider the client’s 
legal landscape, an initial step “of paramount importance.”30 The attorney 
should consider the claims or defenses in the case and interview the client 
to determine how effective search terms may be. Among other things, the 
attorney and client should discuss “the nature of the lawsuit or investiga-
tion, the field of law involved, and the specific causes of action” under 
which a discovery obligation might arise.31 Search terms will not work for 
every case or client. For example, a patent case with highly technical 
language might benefit from search terms32 because searching with the 
technical language as the keywords would retrieve the relevant documents. 
However, cases involving broad causes of action or subjective states of 
intent might not get the same benefit from search terms33 because it is more 
difficult to pinpoint which words will locate the relevant documents. 
Therefore, even the choice to begin developing search terms is a strategic 
decision. 
The attorney and client should also perform a “relevance needs analysis”34 
to determine which documents will be centrally important to the case and 
where those documents might be. In addition to discussing the content of 
these documents, the attorney and client should discuss who might have 
created them, where they are located, and how they are stored.35 The 
attorney should then review these documents and interview key players in 
order to begin developing an understanding of what makes these initial 
documents so relevant.36 For example, in a gender discrimination case 
brought by a woman named Meaghan against her former employer for 
wrongful termination, the defense attorney would know the plaintiff’s 
name, but would also want to know any nicknames or other words the client 
 
29 Id.; see also Sedona Achieving Quality, supra note 11, at 306 (“Technologically advanced tools, 
however ‘cutting edge’ they may be, will not yield a successful outcome unless their use is driven 
by people . . . .”). 
30 Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 209. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Sedona Achieving Quality, supra note 11, at 316 (noting that documents could be in a variety 
of formats, such as in foreign languages, handwritten, or as peculiar file formats—all topics that 
should be discussed). 
36 An attorney’s interviews of the client and early assessments have themselves been protected 
as opinion work product. See infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.  
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used to refer to her. For example, the key players at the client’s office may 
have used a shorter name (Meg), a misspelling (Megan or Meghan), or 
some other appellation (her initials, a nickname, or perhaps a derogatory 
term). The attorney would also need to see documents pertaining to 
Meaghan’s termination and learn from the client how such decisions are 
made. The attorney would look at the documents and create search terms 
that illustrate that document’s relevance. Using “Human Resources De-
partment” does not accurately reflect why a record of a termination is 
relevant, though the term will probably appear on many relevant docu-
ments. Searching for “termination” in conjunction with the various names 
used for the former employee would identify many of the same documents, 
but it would also represent a better distillation of why they are relevant. In 
this way, the attorney begins to develop a theme of the case and reduces 
that theme to keywords. 
Other professionals, such as information technology (IT) specialists, also 
play a helpful role by outlining how the client produces and stores ESI.37 
Working with an IT specialist can help identify the set of ESI on which to 
run the search terms. An IT professional may know about a peculiar method 
that the client uses to store emails, or that intra-office communication mostly 
takes place on an instant messaging system.38 These initial discussions help 
an attorney develop preliminary search terms to retrieve some relevant 
documents.39 
 
37 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (“[A]ttorneys often must rely on 
the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for 
trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the 
attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself.”). Courts have extended work product 
protection to documents created by such professionals. See, e.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP, 
610 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Under Hickman, however, the question is not who created the 
document or how they are related to the party asserting work-product protection, but whether the 
document contains work product—the thoughts and opinions of counsel developed in anticipation 
of litigation.”); Friends of Hope Valley v. Frederick Co., 268 F.R.D. 643, 647 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“The work product doctrine applies not only to documents prepared by an attorney, but to 
documents created by investigators or agents working for attorneys in anticipation of litigation.”). 
38 EDRM Search Guide, supra note 17, § 5, http://www.edrm.net/resources/guides/edrm-search-
guide/searches-during-edrm-workflow-steps (last visited May 6, 2013). 
39 In deciding to apply search terms, other considerations should include time and cost. 
Sedona Achieving Quality, supra note 11, at 316. Attorneys must also weigh the cost of discovery 
against its value to the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (mandating that courts “limit the 
frequency or extent of discovery” if the discovery sought “can be obtained from some other source 
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”). Such a judgment requires an 
attorney to investigate the facts with a client and draw some early assessments. 
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The process of creating search terms ideally involves several iterations 
of analysis by the attorney, client, and other professionals.40 After running 
search terms on the ESI, the attorney reviews the documents retrieved to 
see if they are relevant. In looking at a document, the attorney decides both 
if and why it is relevant, as the search terms should provide an accurate 
reflection of how the retrieved documents are relevant to the case. If the 
documents reveal that a search term does not accurately capture the reason 
why a document is relevant, the attorney modifies that term or adds a new 
term.41 The attorney supplements this review with more interviews and 
discussions with the client to assess the case in light of the new infor-
mation.42 Through this process, an attorney develops the keywords that 
crystallize why he considers the documents important.43  
The attorney runs searches and analyzes the results iteratively to improve 
the terms.44 Precision and recall are important metrics in developing search 
terms; keywords that have poor precision and recall identify too few 
relevant documents and too many nonrelevant ones. Keyword quality can 
be improved through sampling, a process in which the attorney, with the 
help of an IT professional, applies the search terms to a randomly selected 
representative group of documents from the larger set of ESI.45 By looking 
at whether the search terms correctly coded each document as relevant or 
non-relevant, the attorney can decide if the search terms accurately reflect 
what the attorney considers important. If there is poor precision—the 
keyword returns too many nonrelevant documents—the attorney would 
need to devise a more precise term of what is important to the case. If there 
is poor recall—the keyword fails to identify a large number of relevant 
 
40 See Sedona Achieving Quality, supra note 11, at 318. Though outside the scope of this Com-
ment, preliminary search terms produced through such a process should also receive the protection 
of opinion work product. See, e.g., Adelman v. Boy Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 690 (S.D. Fla. 
2011) (“When all the other elements of the privilege are met, draft materials may properly be 
considered work product.”); Ideal Electric Co. v. Flowserve Corp., 230 F.R.D. 603, 609 (D. Nev. 
2005) (holding draft affidavits to be opinion work product because they often contain the 
“attorney’s and client’s mental impressions[ and] strategies, and either solicit or provide legal 
advice”). 
41 EDRM Search Guide, supra note 17, § 9.2, http://www.edrm.net/resources/guides/edrm-
search-guide/validation-of-results (last visited May 6, 2013).  
42 See Sedona Achieving Quality, supra note 11, at 319. 
43 Kessler et al., supra note 27, at S3 (arguing that search terms are a “crystallization of the 
lawyer’s mental impressions, akin to a short memo summarizing the important points of the 
case”). 
44 See Sedona Achieving Quality, supra note 11, at 319. 
45 See EDRM Search Guide, supra note 17, § 9.5, http://www.edrm.net/resources/guides/edrm-
search-guide/validation-of-results (last visited May 6, 2013). 
  
2013] Protecting Search Terms 2073 
 
documents—the attorney would need to add another term reflecting what is 
relevant or modify the existing term.46  
During this process, opposing counsel can choose to offer search terms 
that he believes would retrieve relevant documents, and the attorney can 
run those keywords on a selected group of ESI.47 If the opposing party has 
begun constructing his litigation strategy, he could have his own conclu-
sions—distilled into keywords—about what is important to the case. 
Indeed, even lawyers with access to the same information might create 
different litigation strategies or use different words to describe that strategy.48 
Running terms provided by opposing counsel can certainly fit into this 
iterative process and encourage cooperation between opposing counsel.49 
The attorney continues to collect information from the client by reviewing 
documents and interviewing key players until the search terms produce a 
satisfactory collection of relevant documents. The attorney should docu-
ment the results of these iterative steps, using a variety of methods and 
statistics to do so.50 This documentation may help an attorney analyze the 
search terms, but more importantly, it will help prove to a court that the 
search terms were effective if the need for such proof arises.51  
The final list of words reflects the lawyer’s conclusions about who and 
what is relevant to the litigation. Because the process of creating search 
terms is iterative and attorneys learn more about the case as time goes by, 
the final search terms are truly a complete overview of the attorney’s mental 
impressions, distilled into keywords to find responsive documents. As 
discussed below in Part IV, because the list of search terms reveals the 
lawyer’s conclusions and mental impressions of the case, opinion work 
product protection should apply. 
 
46 Id. at § 9 (listing several methods of ensuring the effectiveness of search terms, including 
frequency analysis, dropped-item validation, and non-hit validation). 
47 Id. at § 5, http://www.edrm.net/resources/guides/edrm-search-guide/searches-during-edrm 
-workflow-steps (last visited May 6, 2013) (providing an example of one party running the 
opponent’s proposed search terms and negotiating use of those terms). 
48 See, e.g., Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc. v. Dowell, No. 10-00653, 2012 WL 
10496, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 2012) (describing the different lists of words the two parties created 
after having the same copy of the defendant’s information, although some discrepancy may be 
attributed to strategy). 
49 See infra Section I.C. 
50 See EDRM Search Guide, supra note 17, § 9, http://www.edrm.net/resources/guides/edrm-
search-guide/validation-of-results (last visited May 6, 2013) (describing various methods to measure 
the results of an ESI search); Sedona Achieving Quality, supra note 11, at 310-13 (same). 
51 See Sedona Achieving Quality, supra note 11, at 313 (urging attorneys to document their 
“quality” process, citing several cases in which attorneys had to prove the reasonableness of their 
searches). 
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C. Opinion Work Product Should Not  
Protect All Search Terms 
Attorneys may choose instead to develop search terms in conjunction 
with opposing counsel, a process that can sometimes be mutually beneficial 
but would result in waiver of the work product protection.52 By discussing 
search terms at a meeting early in the discovery process, attorneys can 
reduce the time, expense, and resources spent on developing keywords.53 
Cooperation ensures that each side participates in the discovery process, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of subsequent litigation disputing the 
reasonableness of discovery.54 According to the Sedona Conference’s Best 
Practices for developing search terms, early meetings between counsel 
“easily should encompass a specific disclosure on search methods and 
protocols to be employed by one or both parties.”55 Similar to an attorney 
developing keywords with the client, opposing counsel would discuss search 
terms iteratively throughout discovery, introducing new information 
learned about the terms—namely, how well they locate relevant docu-
ments—until the parties have arrived at a satisfactory list of keywords.56 
For example, the requesting party proposes terms, the producing party uses 
the terms in a sample search and reports the results, and the parties meet 
again to improve the terms.57 In a world with spiraling litigation costs, 
cooperation can reduce the expense of discovery and also prevent attorneys 
 
52 See William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 262 F.R.D. 354, 361 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Work product protection . . . may be waived by voluntary disclosure to an 
adverse party.”). 
53 Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 212; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (declaring that the goal 
of the Federal Rules is to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding” (emphasis added)). 
54 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 212; see also Symposium, Ethics and Professionalism 
in the Digital Age, 60 MERCER L. REV. 863, 870-71 (2009) [hereinafter Mercer Symposium] 
(crediting cooperation in discovery, namely a disclosure of a sample of search terms to opposing 
counsel, in preventing motion practice to determine the reasonableness of a search in a large 
universe of documents). 
55 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 211. Though the Sedona Practices say such collab-
oration is not mandated or required, some judges take a more aggressive approach. For an example 
of how Judge Facciola, a noted e-discovery leader, manages to break intransigence by counsel and 
catalyze cooperation, see Mercer Symposium, supra note 54, at 888. 
56 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 199 (“Lawyers must recognize that, just as important 
as utilizing the automated tools, is tuning the process in and by which a legal team uses such tools, 
including a close involvement of lead counsel. This may require an iterative process which 
importantly utilizes feedback and learning as tools, and allows for measurement of results.”). 
57 Mercer Symposium, supra note 54, at 872-73 (2009); see generally Jason R. Baron & Edward 
C. Wolfe, A Nutshell on Negotiating E-Discovery Search Protocols, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 229 (2010) 
(attempting to provide practical advice for litigators who confer with opposing counsel regarding 
search terms). 
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from litigating over whether the work product doctrine covers search terms. 
Attorneys are not required to cooperate in the creation of keywords and 
many resist the idea,58 but as dozens of judges have noted in their opinions,59 
it is highly encouraged. 
In contrast, attorneys who do not engage in a reasonable process in 
developing search terms do not receive the protection of work product because 
the search terms do not reveal their mental impressions of the case. For 
example, imagine an attorney who does not interview the client to learn the 
proper vocabulary of the case or the likely sources of documents, such as 
who might have produced relevant information.60 Instead of working with 
the client, the attorney essentially plays “go fish” in selecting search terms.61  
The attorney does not calibrate the keywords to reflect what is considered 
important to the case, but rather just produces the documents retrieved by 
the initial keywords. This unhelpful list of search terms would not receive 
protection as opinion work product. The keywords do not reveal what the 
attorney considers relevant and the lawyer has not developed conclusions 
about the case. Therefore, there would be no risk of opposing counsel 
piggybacking on the attorney’s hard work and mental impressions.62 Search 
terms by themselves do not merit protection as opinion work product; 
search terms that reveal an attorney’s mental impressions of the case, 
however, do merit such protection. 
 
58 See Mercer Symposium, supra note 54, at 917 (asserting a reluctance to share work product 
with opposing counsel prematurely). 
59 The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation has been widely cited in judicial opin-
ions and legal scholarship. For a summary of such citations, as well as judicial endorsements, see The 
Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, SEDONA CONFERENCE, https://thesedonaconference.org/ 
cooperation-proclamation (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
60 I draw this example somewhat from United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 
2008). Judge Facciola did not rule on the reasonableness of the search terms in that case and the 
producing party volunteered the search terms. However, Judge Facciola’s opinion contains enough 
information about the process the attorneys undertook to be illustrative. See Fordham, supra note 
18, at 16 (summarizing the problems in the process of search term design and technology planning 
in O’Keefe). 
61 See Ralph C. Losey, ADVENTURES IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 204-10 (2011) (noting 
that the “negotiated key word search model prevalent in e-discovery today uses the same guessing 
game model as Go Fish”).  
62 See infra Section II.B. Attorneys do not have license to double check the quality of the 
process, however, as there are requirements that must be met before conducting discovery on 
discovery. See infra Section III.B. 
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II. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE  
IN HICKMAN AND THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. The Beginning of the Work Product Doctrine  
in Hickman v. Taylor 
Justifications for protecting search terms as opinion work product reach 
as far back as the beginning of the work product doctrine itself. The work 
product doctrine originated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hickman v. 
Taylor.63 In this seminal case, familiar to most students of Civil Procedure, 
the Court moderated the liberal discovery regime established in the then-
recently enacted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and protected attorneys 
from having to disclose their work product.64 Hickman involved notes taken 
by an attorney during interviews with witnesses to a steamboat accident. 
The requesting party sought disclosure of those notes created by opposing 
counsel.65 The Supreme Court rejected the request and instituted the work 
product doctrine, saying the request was 
an attempt to secure the production of written statements and mental impres-
sions contained in the files and the mind of the [responding party’s attorney] 
without any showing of necessity or any indication or claim that denial of 
such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of [the requesting 
party’s] case or cause him any hardship or injustice.66  
Writing just a few years after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court reeled in the new liberal rules of discovery to prevent 
fishing expeditions by opposing counsel.67 
The Supreme Court then identified an important distinction within the 
work product doctrine between fact and opinion work product, a distinction 
that is particularly relevant to courts grappling with search terms. Under 
this distinction, a “party clearly cannot refuse to answer” a question regard-
ing a fact simply because “the information sought is solely within the 
 
63 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
64 See NORMAN KRIVOSHA & DAVID M. WILLIAMS, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
AND THE CORPORATION 19 (George C. Landrith III ed., 1998) (seeing work product as the “first 
cousin” to attorney-client privilege, as both were created largely “because of the liberalization of 
the discovery rules”). 
65 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498-99. 
66 Id. at 509. 
67 See id. at 510 (“Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted 
inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.”). 
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knowledge of his attorney.”68 Rather, discovery should help reveal facts, a 
point on which the Supreme Court was clear: “Mutual knowledge of all the 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”69 To 
that end, “either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he 
has in his possession.”70 In addition, the Court emphasized that discovery 
should prevent information asymmetry in litigation.71 The Court’s observa-
tions formed the basis of the fact work product doctrine. Fact work product 
protection applies to “factual material that is prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or trial.”72 Fact work product may be disclosed if the requesting 
party can show a “substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the 
party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain 
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.”73 
Opinion work product, on the other hand, covers the “mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other repre-
sentative of a party concerning the litigation.” 74  Typical examples of 
opinion work product include “such items as an attorney’s legal strategy, his 
intended lines of proof, his evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of 
this case, and the inferences he draws from interviews of witnesses.”75 
Opinion work product “may be reflected in interviews, statements, memo-
randa, correspondence, and countless other tangible and intangible ways.”76 
Unlike fact work product, it is very difficult to compel production of 
opinion work product. The robust protections afforded to opinion work 
product originated in Hickman v. Taylor.77 These safeguards were later 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, in which the 
Court held that the disclosure of information that would reveal the attorney’s 
 
68 Id. at 504; see also Amobi v. D.C. Dept. of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2009) (“No 
witness can claim immunity as to facts . . . .”). 
69 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. 
70 Id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 422 (D.N.J. 2009) 
(“Underlying facts are not protected by the work product doctrine.”). 
71 See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 506-07 (explaining that discovery “is not a one-way proposition,” 
but rather “is available in all types of cases at the behest of any party, individual or corporate, 
plaintiff or defendant”). 
72 Kintera, Inc. v. Convio, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 503, 507 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 
73 Disability Rights Council v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 143 
(D.D.C. 2007) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)). 
74 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(3)(B)). 
75 Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985). 
76 Disability Rights Council, 242 F.R.D. at 143. 
77 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947) (requiring a higher showing to compel disclosure of an attorney’s 
files or mental impressions). 
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mental processes was “particularly disfavored.”78 Other courts have gone so 
far as to call opinion work product “absolutely protected”79 and many afford 
attorneys’ opinion work product the highest level of privacy during discov-
ery.80 On the whole, attorneys must disclose work product mirroring their 
thought process only in “rare and extraordinary circumstances.”81 Because of 
these varying levels of protection, the designation of information as fact or 
opinion work product often determines the extent of disclosure and under-
scores the critical importance of search terms being declared opinion work 
product. 
B. The Policies Underlying the Work Product Doctrine 
The Court in Hickman suggested two notable policy reasons for its holding, 
both of which have become cornerstones of the modern work product 
doctrine.82 These policies help answer questions posed by search terms and 
suggest that protecting keywords as opinion work product will most effec-
tively satisfy those policies. 
The Hickman Court’s first policy provides for the protection of the 
attorney’s private thought process. In Hickman, the Court clearly stated that 
“[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted 
inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.”83 Even 
though the then-recently published first edition of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provided for liberalized discovery, the Supreme Court 
found that lawyers still needed “a certain degree of privacy, free from 
 
78 449 U.S. at 399. 
79 Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 429 (D.N.J. 2009); see also 
Sporck, 759 F.2d at 316 (observing that “privacy of preparation is essential to the attorney’s 
adversary role”); Disability Rights Council, 242 F.R.D. at 143 (noting the “special protection” given 
to opinion work product). 
80 See, e.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding opinion 
work product “virtually undiscoverable” (quoting Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & 
Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1997))); St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. 
Corp., 197 F.R.D. 620, 628 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (finding that the Eighth Circuit gives almost 
absolute immunity from disclosure to opinion work product). 
81 Kintera, Inc. v. Convio, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 503, 507 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 
82 See, e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 622 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that the “dual purposes” of the work product doctrine are “(1) to protect an attorney’s thought 
processes and mental impressions against disclosure; and (2) to limit the circumstances in which 
attorneys may piggyback on the fact-finding investigation of their more diligent counterparts”); 
see also JOHN WILLIAMS GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 7.10 (3d ed. 
2012) (asserting that the work product doctrine is designed to protect “three interests of counsel,” 
including privacy and diligence). 
83 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). 
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unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.”84 The protection 
of the attorney’s mental impressions and conclusions is considered to be the 
“primary purpose” of the doctrine.85 The Supreme Court found that the 
“core” of the doctrine “shelters the mental processes of the attorney, 
providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his 
client’s case.”86 This first policy supports this Comment’s contention that 
search terms should be afforded protection as opinion work product, insofar 
as the selection of search terms reveals counsel’s mental impressions and 
conclusions about the case.87 
The second policy considered by the Hickman Court is that attorneys 
should litigate of their own accord, without piggybacking on their oppo-
nents’ thoughts and preliminary legal conclusions. Such leeching would 
upend adversarial litigation and frustrate the process of conceiving a 
strategy.88 Courts have recognized that work product protection prevents an 
attorney from appropriating an opponent’s trial strategies during discovery 
for the attorney’s own use. As explained below, compelling disclosure of 
search terms used during discovery would allow opposing counsel to analyze 
their adversary’s choice of terms and ascertain what their opponent considers 
important in the case and which strategies they may use at trial. 
This second Hickman policy is also geared to protect the integrity of the 
adversarial process itself89 and recognizes the practical realities of a process 
in which litigants mount opposing legal strategies.90 Clients trust attorneys 
 
84 Id. at 510-11. 
85 Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 423 (D.N.J. 2009). 
86 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). 
87 See CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT, WORK-PRODUCT & 
SELF-EVALUATIVE PRIVILEGES § 6:3 (West 2006) [hereinafter CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE] 
(“Work product encompasses counsel’s mental impressions and legal opinions as to how the 
evidence relates to the issues in the litigation, and the selection process used to reach those results.” 
(emphasis added)). 
88 While not a primary policy consideration, it is also important to protect an attorney’s 
ability to assess a case candidly with both counsel and clients without fear that those words will be 
used against her during litigation or at trial as an admission of guilt. See Mattenson v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing how the disclosure of opinion 
work product may lead the “jury to treat candid internal assessments of a party’s legal vulnerabili-
ties as admissions of guilt”); see also In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices, 
& Relevant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-02100, 2011 WL 2580764, at *1 (S.D. Ill. June 29, 2011) 
(noting the need for a zone of privacy free from scrutiny by opposing counsel). 
89 See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1014 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(suggesting that, to function properly, the adversarial system needs attorneys to have zones of 
privacy to analyze cases); see also Amobi v. D.C. Dept. of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(noting that protecting work product in turn protects the adversarial system itself). 
90 See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (suggesting that the 
work product doctrine aids adversarial litigation “by insulating an attorney’s litigation preparation 
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and reveal sensitive information to them because attorneys advocate for 
clients in a “loyal, zealous manner.”91 If protected materials were “open to 
opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in 
writing would remain unwritten,”92 not only because of the attorneys’ own 
privacy concerns, but also because clients may not be as forthcoming.93 
Clients may hesitate to reveal information due to fear of use by opposing 
counsel, thereby frustrating the second Hickman policy.  
As a further example of how forced disclosure may frustrate the adver-
sarial process, opposing counsel may look at the search terms actually used 
and criticize them, insisting on new or different terms. However, each party 
is best situated to determine how to conduct discovery.94 Allowing an 
opponent to demand new terms would overturn the normal process re-
served for attorneys and clients. Furthermore, “for lawyers and judges to 
dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to 
produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where 
angels fear to tread.”95 The second Hickman policy seeks to prevent piggy-
backing and in turn protects the adversarial process. Forcing disclosure of 
search terms would frustrate this important policy. 
C. Work Product Doctrine in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Hickman’s holding was first incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure through the 1970 amendments.96 Parties continue to enjoy liberal 
interpretations of the discovery rules: “The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure strongly favor a full and broad scope of discovery whenever possible, 
allowing a party to obtain discovery of ‘any matter, not privileged, that is 
relevant to the claim or defense of any party.’”97 However, the work 
product doctrine still serves to temper this liberal regime. 
 
from discovery”); Mercer Symposium, supra note 54, at 914 (arguing that forced disclosure will 
compromise client loyalty and confidentiality, undermining clients’ trust in their attorneys’ 
zealous advocacy).  
91 Mercer Symposium, supra note 54, at 914. 
92 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
93 See Mercer Symposium, supra note 54, at 914 (“Restricting the adversarial system will have 
serious and unintended consequences. I believe we have a ‘buy in’ and legitimization of our 
judicial process in no small part because clients believe that they will be zealously represented by 
their attorneys. That is why it ‘works.’”). 
94 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
95 United States v. O’Keefe, 597 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2008) (Facciola, J.). 
96 See GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 13, § 10:9 (“In 1970 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure was amended to provide express protection of work product.”). 
97 Rosenbaum v. Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., No. 08-81004, 2010 WL 623699, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 23, 2010); see also Adelman v. Boy Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“It is 
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Rule 26(b)(3) partially codifies the common-law work product doctrine. 
Under this rule, a party withholding the otherwise discoverable material 
“must demonstrate that the materials withheld are (1) documents and 
tangible things; (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and (3) 
the materials were prepared by or for the party or the attorney asserting the 
privilege.”98 If the producing party establishes these elements, then the 
requesting party has the burden to demonstrate “(1) a substantial need for 
the documents, and (2) an inability to otherwise obtain the materials or 
their ‘substantial equivalent’ without undue hardship.” 99  The Advisory 
Committee’s Notes to the 1970 Amendments to Rule 26(b)(3) discuss how 
the rule requires a “special showing” for the disclosure of an attorney’s 
opinion work product, keeping the rules in line with courts, which have 
“steadfastly safeguarded” work product.100 The federal courts have read the 
Rules to allow for some compelled disclosure, but only in “extraordinary 
circumstances.”101 However, attorneys and clients may not simply assert the 
privilege to receive protection; instead, they must prove that the evidence 
in question deserves the protection.102 
Opinion work product receives greater protection under rule 26 as a 
result of the Court’s decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States. In Upjohn, the 
Court used the policies underlying the doctrine to distinguish between fact 
and opinion work product despite a lack of supporting language in the Rule 
itself.103 While the rules do not specifically differentiate between fact and 
opinion work product, the Upjohn Court maintained that “Rule 26 accords 
special protection to work product revealing the attorney’s mental processes.”104 
In explaining the Court’s implied distinction, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote 
 
well established that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ‘strongly favor full discovery whenever 
possible.’” (quoting Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985))). 
98 Meyer v. Colavita, USA, Inc., No. 11-00696, 2011 WL 2457681, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 
2011). 
99 Id. (citing Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note. 
101 In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 663-64 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the 
choice between affording opinion work product absolute immunity or only nearly absolute 
immunity, the latter of which the Third Circuit announced as its rule).  
102 See Kintera, Inc. v. Convio, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 503, 507 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (“The party claiming 
the work-product privilege bears the burden of establishing that documents claimed as work 
product were prepared in anticipation of litigation.”); see also CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE, 
supra note 87, § 6:7 (noting that attorneys need to “set up the tent” to receive work product 
protection). 
103 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981) (acknowledging that while Rule 26 
does not explicitly make this distinction, “the Hickman Court stressed the danger [of the] . . . 
compelled disclosure . . . [of an] attorney’s mental processes”).  
104 Id. 
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that, although the language of rule 26 does not explicitly create greater 
protection for opinion work product, “this is the sort of material the 
draftsmen of the rule had in mind as deserving special protection.”105 
Notably, while Justice Rehnquist declined to define the requisite standard 
to compel disclosure of opinion work product, he did assert that the Court 
would require “a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by 
other means” than what would be sufficient to compel the disclosure of fact 
work product.106 
III. CURRENT COMMON LAW REGARDING WORK PRODUCT 
The common law has developed to complement the work product doctrine 
as it has been codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because 
“Rule 26(b)(3) only partially codifies the work-product doctrine announced 
in Hickman.”107 In order to implement the policies underlying the work 
product doctrine more fully, courts have stepped in to resolve ambiguities 
and to fill gaps in the law.108 Some of these common-law complements 
affect the treatment of search terms and point to giving keywords greater 
protection as opinion work product.  
A. Courts Go Further than the Federal Rules 
Courts have gone beyond the Federal Rules’ explicit protection of “doc-
uments and tangible things” to protect intangible materials as well.109 In 
United States v. Deloitte LLP, the D.C. Circuit explained that protection 
should “not depend on whether the thoughts and opinions were communi-
cated orally or in writing, but on whether they were prepared in anticipation 
of litigation.”110 This extension of the work product doctrine to cover 
intangible materials makes sense when looking at the underlying policies of 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 402. 
107 United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
108 See, e.g., Meyer v. Colavita, USA, Inc., No. 11-00696, 2011 WL 2457681, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 
June 17, 2011) (extending the protection beyond the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3) to nonparties 
subpoenaed under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iii)). 
109 See Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 136 (“Hickman provides work-product protection for intangible 
work product independent of Rule 26(b)(3).”); see also John K. Villa, Work Product Protection for 
Document Collections: A Quarter-Century After Sporck v. Peil, ACC DOCKET, May 2010, at 106, 108 
(“Although Rule 26(b)(3) does not expressly encompass intangibles, such as the recollections or 
impressions of an investigator hired by counsel, courts have recognized that the work product rule 
in Hickman is broad enough to protect an attorney’s unwritten reflections and recollections.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
110 Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 136. 
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the doctrine. While protecting intangible materials does not necessarily 
encourage attorneys to write down their thoughts or opinions, it does help 
prevent opposing counsel from piggybacking on another’s hard work.111 
Specifically, protecting intangibles would prevent an attorney from asking 
her opponent about any conversations she may have had with her client or 
IT professionals about possible keywords. The process of creating a list of 
keywords for use in discovery centers on a collaborative process between 
attorneys, IT staff, and the client. If courts were willing to compel disclo-
sure of intangibles such as conversations or brainstorming sessions, the 
ability of parties to fashion ideal search terms would be severely hindered 
because those conversations would themselves be hindered. In short, 
treating search terms as opinion work product falls under the same line of 
reasoning found in Deloitte. 
B. Courts Have Limited “Discovery on Discovery”  
in the Context of E-Discovery 
With the recent explosion of technological advances, courts have been 
forced to modify the existing rules of paper discovery in order to accommo-
date the increased use of e-discovery and ESI.112 While “digital evidence has 
proven to be a better truth detector than its paper counterpart,” the sheer 
amount of ESI now subject to discovery has rendered “time-tested discovery 
techniques impractical.”113 Some courts have compelled parties to disclose 
the strategy and methods behind their e-discovery process—a rarity in 
paper discovery114—sometimes even forcing a lawyer’s hand without the 
proper showing.115 This process is often called “discovery on discovery,” and 
some commentators believe judges will become more aggressive in the 
future in ensuring the reasonableness of a party’s discovery procedure.116 
Such a court order flouts the protections and policies of the work product 
doctrine. 
 
111 For a fuller discussion of the policies of the work product doctrine, see supra Section II.B. 
112 See GRENIG & GLEISNER, supra note 13, § 3:2 (noting that courts have been “particularly 
innovative” in adapting existing common law to e-discovery).  
113 Fordham, supra note 18, at 1. 
114 See Kessler et al., supra note 27 (“Could we imagine parties routinely asking to depose 
counsel and interrogate them about how and why they collected certain documents and not others? 
Yet, it has become increasingly common for parties to request an opponent’s selection criteria.”). 
115 See, e.g., Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc. v. Dowell, No. 10-00653, 2012 WL 
10496, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 2012) (requiring both noncooperative parties to submit proposed 
lists of search terms to the court). 
116 See also Mercer Symposium, supra note 54, at 892-93 (predicting that judges will become 
“more aggressive” because of a perceived lack of attorney competence with ESI). 
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A party may conduct discovery on discovery only with the proper show-
ing that the opponent is unlawfully withholding documents that are rele-
vant to the case.117 A court will not compel a party to disclose its discovery 
process as a result of the opponent’s mere suspicion that the party’s process 
has not produced adequate documents.118 The litigants in Ford Motor Co. v. 
Edgewood Properties, Inc., provide a good example of how courts should 
respond to requests for discovery on discovery. In that case, defendant 
Edgewood complained to the court that Ford’s document collection via 
manual review was flawed.119 Edgewood sought to search Ford’s electronic 
records to ensure that Ford’s manual document collection was adequate.120 
The court acknowledged Edgewood’s argument that manual collection of 
documents was not necessarily a reliable method in a world of e-discovery121 
because many litigants are unable to process the large volume of ESI at the 
speed required by the court.122  
Notwithstanding its skepticism of Ford’s process, the court refused to 
compel discovery on discovery and allowed Ford to choose its form of 
document production because “[t]he producing party responding to a 
document request has the best knowledge as to how documents have been 
preserved and maintained.”123 Regardless, if the chosen process is “some-
times even disfavored” by the courts, “the choice is clearly within the 
 
117 Bethea v. Comcast, 218 F.R.D. 328, 329-30 (D.D.C. 2003). 
118 See Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 427 (D.N.J. 2009) (refusing 
to compel a new keyword search solely due to “nefarious speculation” about inadequate production 
of ESI). Judge Facciola of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia wrote two 
landmark opinions on this topic, each finding that mere suspicion of an inadequate production is 
not enough to compel disclosure on discovery. See In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust 
Litig., 219 F.R.D. 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing a party’s suspicion of inadequate production 
due to the small likelihood that some responsive documents remain and the high likelihood that 
the litigant will merely reassert that its current production is adequate); Bethea, 218 F.R.D. at 330. 
119 Edgewood, 257 F.R.D. at 426-27. 
120 Id. at 427. 
121 Id. 
122 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 199 (refuting the idea that manual review should 
be seen as the gold standard of discovery because it is inefficient, expensive, and of questionable 
reliability); see also Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, PRAC. LITIG., May 2004, at 
7, 12 (explaining that keyword searching may be best utilized for identifying and producing 
documents responsive to a specific or narrow topic out of a large universe of information). 
123 Edgewood, 257 F.R.D. at 427. Sedona Principle 6 was a large factor in the court’s decision. 
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 38 (“Responding parties are best situated to 
evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and 
producing their own electronically stored information.”). Comment 6.c recommends that granting 
access to an opponent’s electronic records to assess the adequacy of the production should be the 
exception and not the rule. See id. at 39 (suggesting that such access will likely be fruitless and 
needlessly disruptive). 
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producing party’s sound discretion.”124 Without any showing of bad faith or 
unlawful withholding of documents by Ford, requiring such discovery on 
discovery would “unreasonably put the shoe on the other foot and require a 
producing party to go to herculean and costly lengths . . . .”125 Mere 
suspicion of an opposing party, therefore, is not sufficient to compel 
discovery on discovery. 
Just as the court in Edgewood refused to compel discovery on discovery 
on Ford absent a proper showing, courts should not allow litigants to 
confirm the adequacy of a search by looking at keywords. The “choice” of 
process still remains within a litigant’s discretion, and courts should not 
interfere. If a litigant decides to use search terms to identify responsive 
documents, he has the “best knowledge” to make that decision, especially, in 
contrast to Edgewood, where keywords are not a “disfavored” process.126 
Unfortunately, “what should not become commonplace (and, sadly, is 
starting to) is the forced disclosure of search terms by courts.”127 If an 
opposing party or judge questions the effectiveness of the search terms 
used, the better way to ensure adequacy is to look at the results and meas-
urements about the keywords’ effectiveness documented during the iterative 
process. 128  Mere suspicion about search terms should not overrule the 
Hickman policies that guard against piggybacking or upending of the 
adversarial process, and courts should extend their policy of rejecting 
discovery on discovery to include search terms. As the next Section will 
explain, search terms warrant opinion work product protection. 
IV. COURTS SHOULD PROTECT SEARCH TERMS  
AS OPINION WORK PRODUCT 
Attorneys have increased their use of search terms as the cost of elec-
tronic discovery has skyrocketed.129 This preference for search terms makes 
sense because they are an efficient and effective method of preserving, 
 
124 Edgewood, 257 F.R.D. at 427. 
125 Id. at 428. 
126 Though commentators and judges may criticize keyword-only discovery because of the 
imprecise nature of language, keywords have not yet become a “disfavored” process. See William 
A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting 
some of the problems with search terms, but requiring the parties to cooperate to optimize the use 
of such keywords). 
127 Kessler et al., supra note 27. 
128 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
129 See Sedona Best Practices, supra note 2, at 198-99 (noting that conventional discovery process-
es are ill-suited for the e-discovery world, and suggesting that familiarity with search methodolo-
gies may help contain costs). 
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collecting, and producing ESI compared to manual review.130 However, 
courts across the country have not coalesced around a single way to treat 
these terms and keywords.131 This variety of approaches is understandable 
given the relatively recent inception of e-discovery, but practitioners 
working for major data producers face unnecessary uncertainty about 
whether their work product will be made discoverable.  
Courts have considered search terms and keywords mostly as either fact 
work product or opinion work product and thus I consider each in turn. The 
cases holding that search terms are fact work product often turn on consid-
erations other than the work product doctrine,132 while those holding that 
search terms are opinion work product prove to be more in line with the law 
and policy behind the doctrine. 
A. Characterizing Search Terms as Fact Work Product Violates  
the Policies of Work Product Doctrine 
Many courts consider search terms to be fact work product and afford 
them only the lesser protections of that doctrine. These courts, however, 
usually have a case-specific reason for this finding, and do not decide the 
issue from a purely legal perspective. I will tackle some key cases in the  
e-discovery field that give search terms the protections of fact work product, 
and explain within the context of the work product doctrine why classifying 
search terms as opinion work product would be more consistent with the 
law surrounding discovery generally. 
Judge Facciola has been one of the leading judicial voices for e-discovery 
and has authored one of the leading opinions about search terms and work 
product, Miller v. Holzmann.133 Though Holzmann is not a search term case, 
it does present a situation in which the method of selection was at issue. In 
Holzmann, the plaintiffs sought a protective order so they would not have to 
 
130 See Bennett, supra note 122, at 11-12 (arguing that “keyword searching” would have sub-
stantial impact on the efficiency of reviewing discovery with a specific purpose, such as reviewing 
for privilege). 
131 See Villa, supra note 109, at 106 (“[D]epending upon the jurisdiction and the circumstances 
of the particular case, counsel’s review, selection, and compilation of documents may or may not 
constitute protected opinion work product.”). 
132 See Justin Smith, Note, Seeking Discovery of Search Strategies: In re Exxon Corp. and the 
Work-Product Doctrine in Texas, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 287, 306 (2011) (“There are numerous 
examples of federal courts permitting pervasive discovery of an attorney’s search for responsive 
documents, often times with little or no discussion of work product concerns.”). 
133 238 F.R.D. 30 (D.D.C. 2006). Judge Facciola authored another prominent e-discovery 
opinion the following year. See Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington 
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139 (D.D.C. 2007). Disability Rights Council follows the 
same legal framework as Holzmann. 
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disclose which documents they chose to scan out of the seventy-two boxes 
of documents produced by the defendant.134 The defendant produced about 
150,000 documents in the boxes, out of which the plaintiffs selected and 
scanned 20,000.135 The plaintiffs argued that, under Rule 26(b)(1),136 such 
selection of documents warranted protection as opinion work product, 
whereas the defendants asserted that the documents were generally relevant 
and that the volume of documents made discerning the plaintiffs’ strategy 
an impossibility.137 
Judge Facciola agreed with the defendants, noting precedent in the D.C. 
Circuit and district courts with similar facts.138 He seemed to base his 
opinions on two ideas: the sheer number of documents at issue and the 
intrusiveness of the alternatives. Judge Facciola found that the sheer 
volume of the 20,000 documents made it “difficult to conceive [that the 
defendants would] glean[ the] plaintiffs’ trial strategy solely by virtue of the 
plaintiffs’ disclos[ure of] the identity of the documents.”139 He did not 
discuss particular documents, however, instead relying on the concept that 
such size could not convey strategy. The very act of winnowing the universe 
of documents from 150,000 to 20,000 chosen ones, however, speaks to the 
plaintiffs’ strategy. The defendants now know on which documents to focus, 
because any documents at issue in trial will likely be among that smaller 
subset selected by the plaintiffs. The defendants can also look at the way in 
which the plaintiffs narrowed the field, searching for crucial concepts or 
 
134 Holzmann, 238 F.R.D. at 31. 
135 Id. 
136 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery 
is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 
any party's claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and 
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who 
know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible 
at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.”). 
137 Holzmann, 238 F.R.D. at 31. 
138 Id. at 32. Judge Facciola based his opinion on the precedent set by Washington Bancorpora-
tion v. Said, 145 F.R.D. 274 (D.D.C. 1992). As Judge Facciola writes in Holzmann, Washington 
Bancorporation concerned a document index prepared by one party and sought by opposing 
counsel, which was held not to be opinion work product. Holzmann, 238 F.R.D. at 32. The 
individual documents in the index were factual, but the structure of the index was opinion. Id. The 
volume of the documents overwhelmed the strategy revealed by the index, and the court found the 
index to be fact work product. Id. I would argue that the volume of the documents had little to do 
with the index’s organization, and that producing the index would allow an opponent to piggyback 
on counsel’s strategy. In contrast, producing thousands of documents individually, without 
organizing them, may not allow an opponent to ascertain strategy as easily. 
139 Holzmann, 238 F.R.D. at 32. 
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particular threads in the scanned documents. Moreover, the defendants 
have saved themselves time and money because the plaintiffs used their 
resources to narrow the relevant field of documents. This piggybacking on 
an opponents’ work goes directly against the work product doctrine. 
Judge Facciola also arrived at his fact work product determination because 
“the selection at issue is no more or less revealing than any other means of 
discovery,”140 but he failed to account for the privacy concerns of the work 
product doctrine. Citing In re Shell Oil Refinery,141 the judge explained that 
“other types of discovery,” such as “interrogatories, requests for admissions, 
and preparation of witness lists and a pre-trial” order will inevitably reveal 
which documents the attorneys selected to scan.142 In other words, since the 
defendants will be able to identify some of the documents the plaintiffs 
decided to scan, the defendants will be able to discern all of the documents 
chosen. Beyond the same piggybacking problem described above, Judge 
Facciola did not discuss the work product doctrine’s policy of allowing 
attorneys to work in privacy. Since Hickman v. Taylor, work product has 
allowed attorneys to work without fearing that what they write will be 
exposed. In the future, attorneys will still scan documents, but they may 
alter their methods if their opponent will be able to see which documents 
they selected. Because of the piggybacking concern and the way in which 
privacy allows for effective counsel, Judge Facciola should have found the 
selection process to be opinion work product rather than fact work product. 
A more flat-out denial of work product protection comes in Smith v. Life 
Investors Insurance Company of America.143 The plaintiff in Smith sought to 
agree with the defendant in advance about which terms would be used to 
search for responsive documents.144 Asserting the protection of the work 
product doctrine, the defendant declined to meet with the plaintiffs, 
performed the search with its own keywords, and refused to provide more 
than a “sample” of the search terms.145 The plaintiff then sought to compel 
disclosure of the defendant’s search terms “so that it [could] fully evaluate 
the Defendant’s methodology.”146 Finding that the defendant had a “duty to 
 
140 Id. at 33. 
141 125 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. La. 1989). 
142 Holzmann, 238 F.R.D. at 33 (quoting In re Shell Oil Refinery, 125 F.R.D. at 133). 
143 No. 07-681, 2009 WL 2045197 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2009). 
144 Id. at *7. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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demonstrate that its methodology was reasonable,”147 the court required the 
defendant to share its search terms to prove their adequacy.148 
This finding runs directly counter to the requirements to compel discovery 
on discovery, namely a showing of more than “mere suspicion.”149 The party 
requesting the search terms did not allege any wrongdoing and the court 
does not give any reason why the requesting party would have suspicion 
about their opponents’ document production—only that the plaintiff might 
be understandably frustrated after its attempts to cooperate were re-
buffed.150 Nonetheless, the plaintiff did not make any showing that the 
production was inadequate or incomplete, bringing Smith into tension with 
other case law requiring more than “mere suspicion” to compel discovery on 
discovery.  
The only notable difference between Edgewood and Smith is the infor-
mation sought. In Edgewood, the litigant sought access to the respondent’s 
electronic records in their original location so that the litigant’s outside 
vendor could assess the adequacy of discovery; in Smith, the litigant sought 
the list of search terms. In both cases, the requesting party wanted to 
double check the responding party’s selection of documents for production, 
but the courts reached very different conclusions. The court in Edgewood 
discussed the burden on the responding party of substantially reconstituting 
their document collection process, whereas the responding party in Smith 
could easily have produced its list of search terms. The discoverability of 
the selection process does not depend on the ease with which it may be 
reproduced, however, and the selection process should be protected either 
 
147 Id. (citing Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D. Md. 2008)). 
148 Id.; see also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforce-
ment Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d. 87, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (requiring production of search terms in 
order to assess production, but basing the order on the necessity of such disclosure to ensure 
adequate compliance with the Freedom of Information Act); FormFactor, Inc. v. Micro-Probe, 
Inc., No. 10-03095, 2012 WL 1575093, *7 n.4 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) (echoing the Smith court’s 
reasoning that the adequacy of production could not be assessed without compelling disclosure of 
search terms). 
149 See supra Section II.C. 
150 For an example of a court trying to assess the adequacy of production with good reason, 
see In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., No. 11-2233, 2012 WL 4361430 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2012). 
The Porsche court still described the work-product argument as “without merit,” id. at *7, a 
statement with which I disagree, but the parties in Porsche may have earned such skepticism. 
Porsche concerns an apparently contentious jurisdictional discovery process, and the defendants 
may have unilaterally excluded some relevant documents and offered boilerplate objections to the 
plaintiffs’ discovery requests. Id. at *6. The cases discussed above provide clearer discussions of 
the work product doctrine, but Porsche provides an interesting perspective on the topic. 
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way.151 The choice of discovery method still lies within the discretion of the 
producing party, but the Smith court removed that discretion and allows 
litigants to confirm the adequacy of a search on a whim.  
The court in Smith seemingly balanced the ease with which a list of 
words could be produced against the potential benefit to the requesting 
party. However, the work product doctrine does not hinge on whether a 
document is easy to produce. In Hickman, the Supreme Court could have 
used this balancing test to compel disclosure of the notes because the 
responding party could easily have copied the notes taken during conversa-
tions with witnesses, to the great benefit of the requesting party. Instead, 
the Court denied the request. The Court did not announce in Hickman, or 
later in Upjohn, 152  that courts should balance the policy of protecting 
attorneys’ mental impressions with attorneys’ right to privacy. If courts 
begin to conduct this balancing test, the exception will swallow the rule. 
Many electronic documents now protected by the work product doctrine are 
easy to produce and will become increasingly so. Allowing “mere suspicion” 
to lead to discovery on discovery will frustrate the policies of the work 
product doctrine because attorneys will be less likely to write down their 
thoughts to assess a case candidly and will be forced to disclose their mental 
impressions as distilled in their keyword searches. 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania went even further in Romero v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., finding that search terms do not have “any work 
product protection” because they merely convey a fact about the litiga-
tion.153 Romero concerned an alleged program by Allstate to change the 
status of their insurance sales agents from employees to independent 
contractors in order to avoid paying their pension, profit sharing, and other 
employee benefit plans.154 As part of this alleged transition, Allstate had the 
insurance sales agents sign a release waiving their rights.155 There were 
many document requests at issue in the case but the pertinent dispute 
concerned a request by the plaintiff sales agents for a conference with the 
defendant Allstate about which search terms the defendant had used 
previously and would use in the future.156 The court stressed the need for 
cooperation between counsel when it ordered the parties to confer regarding 
 
151 See Kessler et al., supra note 27 (“Unfortunately, some courts in the face of a dispute have 
conflated the ease with which search terms can be shared with a requirement that they be 
shared.”). 
152 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).  
153 271 F.R.D. 96, 110 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
154 Id. at 99. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 109. 
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search terms, custodians, date ranges, and “any other essential details,”157 
but resolutely dismissed any work product argument by the defendant.158 
The court found that search terms go to “the underlying facts of what 
documents are responsive to Plaintiffs’ document requests and do[] not 
delve into the thought processes of Defendants’ counsel.”159 
The Smith court implied that search terms do not merit opinion work 
product protection because a search term only reveals what is responsive to 
a party’s document request.160 This would make sense if the parties agreed 
on the search terms prior to discovery, because then the only unknown fact 
would be which documents were responsive to that term. However, discovery 
of which documents are responsive to search terms requires merely looking 
at the documents produced. To follow the logic of the Smith court, the 
process by which a litigant identifies and produces a document simply 
reflects the fact that the document is responsive—the process itself does not 
convey any information regarding the responding party’s litigation strategy. 
However, that process can speak volumes about an attorney’s assessment of 
the strength of the case. An opponent can discern valuable information by 
analyzing the persons or groups selected for document preservation, the file 
containers searched, the method by which the party preserves data, and 
other such factors. Moreover, how an attorney decides to engage in the 
discovery process with the client can reveal crucial information to the 
opponent. If a party wants to know which documents are responsive to their 
requests, the answer should come in the form of document production, not 
discovery on discovery.  
B. Protecting Search Terms As Opinion Work Product Is Consistent  
With the Classification of Other Materials 
Classifying search terms as opinion work product would most closely 
align with the policy of the work product doctrine and how courts have 
considered other similar materials. Though e-discovery remains a new and 
rapidly developing field, there is no need to invent a “law of the horse”161 
 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 110. 
159 Id.   
160 The Romero court stressed this in a footnote, where it wrote, “Plaintiffs ask defense coun-
sel to reveal not what documents they believe are relevant to the case, but rather what documents 
are, as a matter of fact, responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.” Id. at n.9. 
161 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207, 208 (1996) (cautioning legal thinkers that new problems often have solutions 
derived from existing law). 
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when the work product doctrine provides for a clear and sensible solution.162 
There have not been many court decisions about e-discovery or search 
terms, but many appellate decisions about discovery provide good guidance 
on how district courts should treat search terms. The most persuasive 
opinions point to protecting search terms as opinion work product. 
1. The Third Circuit Laid the Foundations for Treating Search  
Terms as Opinion Work Product in Sporck v. Peil  
The Third Circuit’s landmark decision in Sporck v. Peil 163 provides the 
foundation for protecting search terms as opinion work product. The issue 
in Sporck was “whether the selection process of defense counsel in grouping 
certain documents together out of the thousands produced in the litigation 
was work product entitled to protection” under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Hickman.164 The counsel for Peil, the plaintiff, received 
“hundreds of thousands of documents” from defendant Sporck as a result of 
discovery requests and made copies of about 100,000.165 Sporck’s counsel 
prepared him for his deposition by selecting, out of the documents they 
produced to Peil, an unknown number of documents.166 Sporck’s counsel 
believed these documents would be helpful and relevant for the deposition, 
though they “conceded that none of the individual documents, in their 
redacted form, contained work product of defense counsel.”167 During the 
deposition, Peil’s attorney asked Sporck whether he examined any docu-
ments in preparation for deposition, and then requested identification and 
production of all the documents Sporck reviewed. 168  Defense counsel 
refused, pointing out that all responsive documents had been produced and 
that “the select grouping of the documents was attorney work product 
protected from discovery . . . .”169 
The Third Circuit concluded that “the selection and compilation of doc-
uments by counsel . . . in preparation for pretrial discovery falls within 
 
162 Courts would not have to fight attorneys to implement this rule. See Villa, supra note 109, 
at 106 (“To many litigators, it is an article of faith that an attorney’s selection or compilation of 
documents reflects her thought processes or legal analysis, so as to constitute protected opinion 
work product. Surprisingly, the doctrine . . . has not been universally followed by the federal 
circuits.”). 
163 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985). 
164 Id. at 315. 
165 Id. at 313. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 314. 
169 Id. 
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the highly-protected category of opinion work product.”170 This means “an 
almost absolute protection from discovery because any slight factual content 
that such items may have is generally outweighed by the adversary system’s 
interest in maintaining the privacy of an attorney’s thought processes and in 
ensuring that each side relies on its own wit in preparing their respective 
cases.”171 The Third Circuit emphasized that the “central justification for 
the work product doctrine” is “[p]reserving the privacy of preparation that 
is essential to the attorney’s adversary role.”172 Without this zone of privacy, 
attorneys would hesitate to write down their thoughts173 or prepare their 
clients for depositions and trials.174 
Though this case came years before the emergence of e-discovery, it is 
the most commonly cited case by those who argue that search terms are 
opinion work product.175 Though Sporck does not provide a directly on-
point precedent, its arguments are extremely persuasive. In Sporck, the 
Third Circuit protected the compilation of documents because it would 
“reveal defense counsel’s selection process,” which would in turn reveal the 
attorney’s mental impressions.176 The potential exposure of an attorney’s 
“mental impressions and legal opinions” through the selection process 
warranted the protection of opinion work product.177 The Third Circuit 
sought to protect this selection process because it is the initial time during 
which the attorney crafts and begins implementing strategy. Allowing 
opposing counsel to compel disclosure of the attorney’s strategy implicates 
the policies identified in Hickman and referenced in Sporck, both of which 
continue to be important issues today. 
Cases involving e-discovery, such as Smith, are not materially different 
simply because they involve a party who does not trust its opponent’s 
production. The requesting party in Sporck never alleged any improper 
concealment or inadequate production of documents,178 and so the Third 
Circuit did not discuss what kind of finding would suffice for discovery on 
discovery. However, as discussed in Section III.B., “mere suspicion” does 
 
170 Id. at 316. The Third Circuit found the district court’s order to produce all documents 
used to prepare the deponent to be a “clear error of law.” Id. at 315. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 496, 511 (1947)). 
174 Id. at 317. 
175 See Villa, supra note 109, at 106 (finding that the opinion work product argument was 
“identified most clearly by the Third Circuit in Sporck v. Peil”). 
176 Sporck, 759 F.2d at 315. 
177 Id. 
178 See id. at 313 (“There is no allegation in this case that defendants have improperly con-
cealed or refused to produce requested documents.”). 
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not allow an attorney to fish for discovery abuses in opposing counsel’s 
process.179 Although the requesting party in Smith wanted discovery on 
discovery to evaluate his opponent’s discovery process, there was still no 
allegation of wrongdoing. Therefore, the district court’s decision in Smith 
appears to be in tension with the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Sporck. While 
there may be large differences between the paper world of Sporck and the 
electronic world of Smith, attorneys’ lack of facility with ESI should not 
mean that opposing counsel may invade the discovery process. For cases 
without an allegation of wrongdoing, courts should follow the Third 
Circuit’s lead in Sporck and protect the selection process of documents, 
particularly search terms, as opinion work product. 
2. Other Courts Have Picked Up Where Sporck Left Off 
Some courts have followed the Third Circuit’s lead and held that the 
process of selection and compilation warrants protection as opinion work 
product. Though Sporck remains the leading case,180 these cases provide 
guideposts for judges and lawyers navigating the new world of e-discovery 
and can help courts make the decision regarding work product protection 
for search terms. 
a. Selection Criteria Merit Opinion Work Product Protection 
In Shelton v. American Motors Corp., the Eighth Circuit agreed with the 
Third Circuit’s conclusion, protecting an attorney’s “mental selective 
process” and “compilation of documents” because disclosure would reveal 
her “legal theories and thought processes.”181 Shelton, like Sporck, involved 
an attorney’s selection of documents and a deposition.182 The plaintiffs 
sought to depose Rita Burns, an in-house litigator for the defendant, 
American Motors Corporation. 183 Ms. Burns refused to answer several 
questions at her deposition about the existence of documents regarding the 
allegedly faulty car model at issue in the case, and again refused to answer 
them before a magistrate judge.184 As a result of Ms. Burns’s refusals, the 
 
179 See supra Section III.B. 
180 Even when cases do not follow Sporck, they tend to distinguish it by name. See, e.g., Miller 
v. Holzmann, 238 F.R.D. 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2006) (calling Sporck a “seminal case” despite arriving at 
a different conclusion). 
181 805 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir. 1986). 
182 Id. at 1325. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. Burns’s response to these questions was, “Any information I have concerning docu-
ments which might possibly be responsive to your question, I’ve acquired solely through my 
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district court entered a default judgment against American Motors. The 
Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that because Ms. Burns “engaged in a 
selective process of compiling documents from among voluminous files in 
preparation for litigation . . . the mere acknowledgement of the existence 
of those documents would reveal [her] mental impressions, which are 
protected as work product.”185 
The court asserted that Ms. Burns’s disclosure of the process by which 
she selected documents to review for litigation would have “reveal[ed] her 
legal theories and opinions,” and so the process constituted opinion work 
product.186 According to Ms. Burns, whether she knew about the existence 
of certain documents revealed that she considered them important to the 
litigation.187 As such, the disclosure of any such information would be “a 
reflection of judgments and evaluations that [she had] made as a lawyer in 
the process of defending [her] client.”188 The Eighth Circuit agreed, noting 
that “[i]n cases that involve reams of documents and extensive document 
discovery, the selection and compilation of documents is often more critical 
than legal research.”189 This reaches beyond the mere factual existence of 
documents,190 as Ms. Burns would have had to deem the identified docu-
ment important enough to look at, and, more importantly, to remember.191 
Ms. Burns’s process of selecting individual documents out of a large 
universe of information to prepare for litigation corresponds directly to the 
current practice of using search terms. When a party receives a document 
request and uses search terms to retrieve responsive documents, she 
compiles search terms by drawing on the relevant, important ideas of the 
case. No attorney selects irrelevant or wasteful search terms. While an 
attorney’s immediate recollection of a particular document may suggest 
future use of that document, disclosure of search terms will also inevitably 
reveal trial strategy as well. Just as in Sporck, Shelton “does not involve [the 
defendants’] refusal to produce the documents inquired about by plaintiff’s 
counsel.” There was no allegation of wrongdoing,192 and as a result the court 
 
capacity as an attorney . . . in my efforts to find information which would assist me in defending 
the company in litigation, and therefore, I decline to respond to the question.” Id. 
185 Id. at 1326. 
186 Id. at 1328. 
187 Id. (citing Burns’s Second Deposition at 19). 
188 Id. at 1329 (citing Burns’s Second Deposition at 38). 
189 Id.  
190 See id. (“[T]he questions asked require more than merely acknowledging the existence of 
certain documents.”). 
191 See id. at 1328 (“[S]ince it was important enough to remember, she may be relying on it in 
preparing her client’s case.”). 
192 Id. 
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simply allowed the attorney to work in private, protecting the process by 
which she implemented her legal theories and opinions—including key-
words—during discovery. 
b. Arrangement of Information by Keywords Merits  
Opinion Work Product Protection 
In In re Allen,193 the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Shelton and Sporck 
courts that an attorney’s process of selecting documents deserves opinion 
work product protection. In re Allen involved the selection and arrangement 
of certain employment documents by Barbara Allen,194 outside counsel for 
the West Virginia Attorney General’s Office,195 who was retained to inves-
tigate potential document mismanagement and breaches of confidentiality 
and security.196 During her investigation of the Attorney General’s Office, 
she selected certain employment records and arranged them in anticipation 
of litigation.197 The Fourth Circuit held that the “choice and arrangement 
constitutes opinion work product because Allen’s selection and compilation 
of these particular documents reveals her thought processes and theories 
regarding this litigation.”198 The court emphasized that the protection did 
not extend to the documents themselves, “just Allen’s selection and 
arrangement of them.”199 
Just as in Shelton, the process by which Allen selected the employment 
records would reveal her thoughts about the case (however, as the court 
recognized, if the individual documents were responsive to her opponent’s 
document requests, Allen would have to produce them). Like the Sporck and 
Shelton courts, the Fourth Circuit recognized in In re Allen that Allen’s 
selection of records deserved protection.  
However, the In re Allen court also discussed the arrangement of the 
records—in fact, the Fourth Circuit paired “arrangement” of documents 
with “selection” of documents at every point in the brief section of its 
opinion discussing the work product doctrine.200 Search keywords do not 
just identify responsive documents, but can also group documents according 
to which documents were responsive to a particular keyword. Protecting 
this arrangement of documents, then, becomes important to prevent 
 
193 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997). 
194 Id. at 608. 
195 Id. at 589. 
196 Id. at 598. 
197 Id. at 608. 
198 Id.  
199 Id. 
200 Id. (referring to the “choice and arrangement” of records). 
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opposing counsel from piggybacking on an attorney’s grouping of docu-
ments for different pieces of the litigation. Certain keywords may clearly 
retrieve specific groups of documents; an attorney could therefore use the 
forcibly disclosed keywords to search the documents produced by opposing 
counsel during discovery and recreate how opposing counsel grouped the 
documents. In essence, this would allow the attorney to identify opposing 
counsel’s conclusion about what is important to the case, the search term 
that distills that conclusion, and the selection of documents responsive to 
that search term. Moreover, the attorney would know which documents 
opposing counsel had chosen as important for certain parts of the litigation. 
Therefore, permitting disclosure of the search terms would not only enable 
the opponent to learn how an attorney grouped the documents, but also 
how the documents were selected. As such, for both of the reasons set out 
by the Fourth Circuit, keywords merit opinion work product protection. 
c. Permitting Disclosure of Keywords May Prevent Attorneys from Candidly 
Assessing a Client’s Case 
One of the chief concerns of the opinion work product doctrine is the 
protection of the attorney’s privacy.201 Because of this concern, courts have 
protected as opinion work product an attorney’s “evaluation of the strengths 
and weaknesses of [the] case.”202 Keywords implicate this policy because 
they can indicate to opposing counsel the themes or ideas that an attorney 
has decided may be the potential weaknesses in a case.  
The Seventh Circuit has been relatively conservative in its compulsion 
of work product and, as a result, protects evaluations of a client’s case as 
opinion work product. For example, in Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp.,203 Judge Posner protected as opinion work product the notes taken by 
an attorney during a client meeting regarding possible legal liabilities.204 
The plaintiff in Mattenson sued his former employer, Baxter Healthcare, for 
violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by firing him and 
replacing him with a younger worker.205 The defense attorney in Mattenson, 
the company’s chief employment lawyer, had previously met with two of 
the plaintiff’s superiors and scribbled some notes on a legal notepad 
concerning her opinions about the fact pattern and about possible legal 
 
201 See supra Section II.B for a discussion of the policies underlying the work product doctrine, 
including attorney privacy. 
202 Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985). 
203 438 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2006). 
204 Id. at 767-68. 
205 Id. at 765. 
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liabilities.206 This, according to Judge Posner, constituted work product 
because “it [wa]s a lawyer’s thoughts about a potential suit against the 
company, noting some of the strengths and weaknesses of the company’s 
case.”207 He did not want an opponent to “get the inside dope on that 
party’s strategy” or for opposing counsel to invite the jury to “treat candid 
internal assessments of a party’s legal vulnerabilities as admissions of 
guilt.”208 The court prevented plaintiff’s counsel from using defense coun-
sel’s mental impressions and conclusions against her own client, something 
that could happen in compelled disclosure of search terms. 
Like search terms, keywords can also allow opposing counsel to “get the 
inside dope” on trial strategy and to see which keywords line up with 
weaknesses in the case. For example, attorneys will want to discover 
documents that are responsive to keywords likely to be used against their 
client. Allowing attorneys to comb through their opponent’s search terms 
will lead to the very scenario of which the Supreme Court has disapproved: 
because they know those terms will be disclosed later, attorneys will hesitate 
to search through their own or their opponent’s data thoroughly with 
precise keywords.209 Furthermore, an attorney’s attempts to prepare fully 
for litigation might be used to inculpate her at trial. As detailed in Matten-
son, the potential for invasion of privacy and piggybacking would be 
significant. 
CONCLUSION 
Electronic communication, and its role in discovery, has not made life 
easy for the courts, and many judges first learn of the new technology as 
they hear cases on it.210 With e-discovery becoming so important to litiga-
tion, and with many lawyers resistant to change,211 there may be hesitation 
 
206 Id. at 768. The notes included language such as “have other heads rolled for losing patents,” 
which was the defendant’s purported reason for firing Mattenson, and “legal vulnerabilities: age 
51, allege ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act].” Id. (alteration in original).  
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (“At its core, the work-product 
doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he 
can analyze and prepare his client’s case. But the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded 
in the realities of litigation in our adversary system.”). 
210 See Kimberly Atkins, Technical Difficulties at the Supreme Court, DC DICTA (Apr. 19, 2010, 
1:30 PM), http://lawyersusaonline.com/dcdicta/2010/04/19/technical-difficulties-at-the-supreme-
court-2 (recounting some of the Supreme Court Justices’ confused questions about texting during 
oral arguments in City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)). 
211 Mercer Symposium, supra note 54, at 891 (providing anecdotal evidence from a leading  
e-discovery judge about the reluctance of some attorneys to adapt their practice to e-discovery). 
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to trust in attorneys’ abilities to conduct e-discovery properly. Though 
protecting search terms as opinion work product creates information 
asymmetry, the discovery process has always had such asymmetry.212 Using 
a reasonable process to develop search terms, like the Sedona Conference’s 
Best Practices suggest, should be enough to appease courts’ concerns 
without forcing disclosure of search terms. Furthermore, reviewing the 
reports and documentation of the search terms’ effectiveness, and the 
responsiveness of the documents actually produced, rather than compelling 
disclosure of the keywords, should be the focus of the court’s attention if 
there are any doubts. 
Because revealing well thought-out search terms is akin to revealing an 
attorney’s mental impressions of the case, such disclosure runs directly 
counter to the work product doctrine and its policies. The current rules of 
the work product doctrine translate smoothly to keywords. Protecting a 
client’s keywords as opinion work product would help fulfill the policy goals 
of the work product doctrine by preventing invasion of the attorney’s 
private thoughts and, importantly, by preventing piggybacking that could 
skew the adversarial process. Abandoning such longstanding and worth-
while policies to double check an attorney’s well thought-out keywords 
without more than a showing of “mere suspicion” would upend the work 
product doctrine. While there have not been many appellate decisions about 
e-discovery to guide lower courts, the relevant jurisprudence for work 
product indicates that protecting search terms as opinion work product, 
rather than fact work product, would be more in line with how courts have 
addressed analogous material. This is an issue that many courts will likely 
continue to debate in the future, but even today, the relevant case law 
supports that protecting search terms as opinion work product best fulfills 
the work product doctrine and its policies. 
 
212 Id. at 866 (explaining that one party has always had privileged access to its own “enor-
mous data set” but e-discovery requires “intelligent” search terms to sift through the ESI). 
